The Declining Significance of Race: Revisited & Revised by Wilson, William Julius
 
The Declining Significance of Race: Revisited & Revised
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Wilson, William Julius. 2011. The Declining Significance of
Race: Revisited & Revised. Daedalus 140.2: 55-69.
Published Version doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00077
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:16:47 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8052151
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and
conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAThe Declining Signi½cance of Race: 
Revisited & Revised
William Julius Wilson
© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
WILLIAMJULIUSWILSON, a
Fellow of the American Acade-
my since 1988, is the Lewis P. and
LindaL. Geyser University Pro-
fessor at Harvard University. His
recent publications include When
Work Disappears: The World of the
New Urban Poor(1996), which re-
ceived the Sidney Hillman Foun-
dation Award; There Goes the Neigh-
borhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class
Tensions in Four Chicago Neighbor-
hoods and Their Meaning for Amer-
ica(with Richard Taub, 2007); and
More than Just Race: Being Black
and Poor in the Inner City(2009). 
Ipublished The Declining Signi½cance of Race: Blacks
and Changing American Institutions thirty-two years
ago, in 1978.1Given the furor and controversy over
the book immediately following its publication, I
did not anticipate that it would go on to become a
classic. Indeed, the book’s impact on the ½eld of
race and ethnic relations–its arguments have been
discussed in nearly eight hundred empirical re-
search articles, not to mention the nonempirical
studies–lends credence to the idea of productive
controversy and to George Bernard Shaw’s famous
dictum: “[I]t is better to be criticized and misun-
derstood than to be ignored.” My motivation for
this essay is to reflect on responses to the book
that claim to provide an empirical test of my the-
sis. In the process, I indicate the extent to which
important ½ndings have influenced my thinking
since the book’s publication.
The theoretical framework in The Declining Signi½-
cance of Race relates racial issues to the economic
and political arrangements of society. I argued that
changes in the system of production and in govern-
ment policies have affected, over time, black/white
access to rewards and privileges as well as racial
antagonisms. I advanced this framework to accom-
plish two major objectives: (1) to explain histori-
cal developments in U.S. race relations and (2) to
account for paradoxical changes in the black class
structure whereby, beginning in the last few de-
cades of the twentieth century, the socialand eco-
55nomic conditions of the black poor
deteriorated while those of the black
middle class improved. 
In an elaboration of this framework, I
focused on three periods of American
race relations: the preindustrial period
of antebellum slavery and the early post-
bellum era; the industrial period that be-
gan in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and ended at roughly the New
Deal era; and the modern industrial
post–World War II era. I pointed out
that whether one focuses on the way
race relations were structured by the
system of production, the polity, or both,
racial oppression–ranging from the ex-
ploitation of black labor by the business
class (including the plantation elite) to
the elimination of black competition for
economic, political, and social resources
by the white masses–was characteristic
of both the preindustrial and industrial
periods of American race relations.
However, I noted that despite the prev-
alence of various forms of racial oppres-
sion, the change from a preindustrial 
to an industrial system of production
enabled African Americans to increase
their economic and political resources.
The proliferation of jobs created by in-
dustrial expansion helped generate and
sustain the continuous mass migration
of blacks from the rural South to urban
centers, especially the cities of the North
and West. As the urban black population
grew and became more segregated, insti-
tutions and organizations in the African
American community also developed
alongside a business and professional
class af½liated with these institutions. 
Nonetheless, it was not until after
World War II (the modern industrial
period) that black class structure began
to take on some of the characteristics of
white class structure and that economic
class gradually became more important
than race in determining the life chances
of individual African Americans. Several
historical shifts accounted for these devel-
opments. In the preindustrial and indus-
trial periods, the basis of racial inequality
was primarily economic; in most situa-
tions, the state was merely an instrument
to reinforce patterns of race relations
that grew out of the social relations of
production.2Except for the brief period
of fluid race relations in the North from
1870 to 1890, the state was a major instru-
ment of racial oppression. 
State intervention designed to promote
racial equality, together with the recipro-
cal relationship between the polity and
the economy, has characterized the mod-
ern industrial period. Indeed, it is dif½-
cult to determine which factor has been
more important in shaping race relations
since World War II. Economic expansion
facilitated black movement from the ru-
ral areas of the South to the industrial
centers and created job opportunities
leading to greater occupational differen-
tiation in the African American commu-
nity, as an increasing percentage of blacks
moved into semiskilled and skilled blue-
collar positions and white-collar posi-
tions. At the same time, government in-
tervention (in response to the pressures
of increased black political resources and
the civil rights protest movements) re-
moved many arti½cial discrimination
barriers with municipal, state, and feder-
al civil rights legislation. Moreover, state
intervention contributed to the more lib-
eral racial policies of the nation’s labor
unions with protective union legislation.
These combined economic and political
changes created a pattern of black occu-
pational upgrading that resulted, for ex-
ample, in a substantial decline of African
Americans in low-paying service jobs,
unskilled labor, and farm jobs.
Given greater occupational differentia-
tion, some aspects of structural economic
change have resulted in a closer associa-
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ty and class af½liation. Access to higher-
paying jobs is increasingly based on edu-
cational criteria–a situation that distin-
guishes the modern industrial period
from earlier systems of production and
that has made the position of the black
poor more precarious. In other words,
the rapid growth of the corporate and
government sectors has created a seg-
mented labor market that currently pro-
vides vastly different mobility opportu-
nities for different segments of the Afri-
can American population. On the one
hand, poorly trained and educationally
limited African Americans have seen
their job prospects increasingly limited
to low-wage sector jobs, they have faced
rising rates of unemployment and non-
labor-force participation, and they have
endured slower movements out of pov-
erty. On the other hand, trained and edu-
cated African Americans have experi-
enced increased job opportunities in the
corporate and government sectors as a
result of the expansion of white-collar
positions and the pressures of state af-
½rmative action programs.
Accordingly, the mobility pattern of
blacks is consistent with the view that in
the modern industrial period, economic
class has become more important than
race in predetermining job placement
and occupational mobility for African
Americans. In the economic realm, the
black experience has moved historically
from economic racial oppression experi-
enced by virtually all African Americans
to the economic subordination of the
black poor. As a result, a deepening eco-
nomic schism has developed in the Afri-
can American community, with the
black poor falling further and further
behind higher-income blacks.
Moreover, the center of racial conflict
has shifted from the industrial sector to
the sociopolitical order. Neither the 
low-wage sector nor the corporate and
government sectors provide the basis for
the kind of interracial job competition
and conflict that plagued the economic
order in previous years. The absorption
of blacks into industrial unions and the
federal government’s protective union
legislation effectively negated manage-
ment’s ability to undercut the demands
of white workers for higher wages by
replacing them with black workers. The
traditional racial struggles for power and
privilege have largely shifted away from
the economic sector and are now con-
centrated in the sociopolitical order, as
racial tensions have more to do with ra-
cial competition for public schools, mu-
nicipal political systems, and residential
areas than with competition for jobs.
Although these developments within 
the sociopolitical order also affect the
ultimate life chances of African Ameri-
cans, their respective impact on social
mobility opportunities is not as great as
racial competition and antagonisms in
the economic sector. 
Thus, the original argument, as out-
lined in The Declining Signi½cance of Race,
was not that race is no longer signi½cant
or that racial barriers between blacks
and whites have been eliminated. Rather,
in comparing the contemporary situation
of African Americans to their situation
in the past, the diverging experiences of
blacks along class lines indicate that race
is no longer the primary determinant of
life chances for blacks (in the way it had
been historically). 
In a paper reflecting on the critical
reaction to The Declining Signi½cance of
Race immediately following publica-
tion of the book, the late sociologist
Robin M. Williams, Jr., pointed out:
Despite the author’s explicit quali½cations
and speci½cations, some critics seem to
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that both racial discrimination and class
position importantly affect life-chances
and that it is the changing character of the
interactionof the two structural conditions
that is critical for understanding the pres-
ent situation. The increasing differentials
within the black population in income,
education, occupational prestige, and
power-authority seem clear beyond dis-
pute. That past-institutionalized racism
has powerfully shaped these differentials 
is equally plain, as is the fact that large
average interracial differentials continue 
to exist. What Wilson argues is only that
economic class has become moreimpor-
tant than race in determining job place-
ment and occupational mobility, as sig-
nalized by the growth of a black middle
class concurrently with the crystalliza-
tion of a disproportionately large black
underclass.3
As Williams indicates, my basic argu-
ment, including its underlying thesis–
regarding the effect of economic and po-
litical changes on the shifting relative im-
portance of race and class in black occu-
pational mobility and job placement–
is largely unaddressed in the many hun-
dreds of studies responding to The De-
clining Signi½cance of Race. For example,
many of the articles whose titles play on
the phrase “the declining signi½cance of
race” focus on issues that do not relate 
to my speci½c arguments–issues such
as environmental racial inequality, skin
tone differentials, mate selection, Amer-
ica’s drug crisis, capital punishment, and
psychological well-being and quality of
life.4Others discuss residential segrega-
tion, school racial composition, and dis-
crimination in public places without re-
lating reported ½ndings to my arguments
regarding the shift in the concentration
of racial antagonisms from the econom-
ic sector to the sociopolitical order.5
Of the universe of empirical studies
that claim to respond to The Declining
Signi½cance of Race, I would like to high-
light the high-quality publications that
correctly address my thesis–including
studies that fundamentally uphold or
provide partial support for my arguments
as well as those that challenge my basic
claims. In the process, I will show how
some of these studies have led me to re-
vise or extend parts of my basic thesis,
especially as it pertains to race and in-
terracial relations today. 
Inher important book Facing Up to the
American Dream, Harvard political scien-
tist Jennifer Hochschild states, “One has
not really succeeded in America unless
one can pass on the chance for success to
one’s children.”6She highlights research
on the occupational attainments and
mobility of blacks revealing that, as late
as 1960, there was no evidence to suggest
that the effect of economic class position
could rival the effect of race in terms of
blacks’ achievements in occupation and
income. Race, or skin color, was such 
a powerful factor in life that it clearly
trumped class. As Hochschild puts it,
blacks “‘experienced a perverse sort of
egalitarianism’–neither the disadvan-
tages of poverty nor the advantages of
wealth made much difference in what
they could achieve or pass on to their
children. Discrimination swamped 
everything else.” However, beginning in
the early 1960s, she argues, class began
to affect career and generational mobil-
ity for blacks as it had done regularly 
for whites: “Well-off black men thus
could begin for the ½rst time in Ameri-
can history to expect their success to
persist and accumulate. Since 1973 
these trends have continued, although
less dramatically.”7
The research that Hochschild cites
includes an important study by sociolo-
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California, Berkeley.8Analyzing data on
intergenerational and intragenerational
mobility of black men from the Occupa-
tional Changes in a Generation surveys
of 1962 and 1973, Hout found support for
arguments advanced in The Declining Sig-
ni½cance of Race. More speci½cally, he re-
vealed that between 1962 and 1973, class
signi½cantly affected intragenerational
mobility for African Americans–a phe-
nomenon similar to class effects among
whites. As class differences in intergener-
ational mobility increased, African Amer-
ican men from the most advantaged 
socioeconomic backgrounds experi-
enced the greatest upward mobility.9
Although Hout’s ½ndings are impor-
tant, as sociologists Arthur Sakamoto
and Jessie M. Tzeng explain, they “gen-
erally pertain to the period immediately
before and after the civil rights move-
ment”; therefore, they do not cover the
wide temporal span of The Declining Sig-
ni½cance of Race, “which is about changes
across broad historical periods.”10 By
analyzing the 1940 and 1990 Public Use
Microdata Sample (pums) data sets (a
large, nationally representative sample
of the occupational attainment of black
and white males in all sectors of the la-
bor force), Sakamoto and Tzeng were
able to test my thesis over a broader time
span.11They found that whereas race was
generally more important than class in
determining occupational attainment
among blacks during the industrial peri-
od of 1940, class was clearly more impor-
tant than race in determining occupation-
alattainment among black men during
the modern industrial period of 1990.
Indeed, their results “indicate that the
net disadvantage of being black is sub-
stantially greater in the industrial period
than in the modern industrial period.”12
More speci½cally, after controlling for
labor-force experience, schooling, and
region, Sakamoto and Tzeng found that
the effect of race was smaller in 1990
than in 1940 for every level of education
and sector attainment investigated. Fur-
thermore, when comparing the impact
of education with that of being black,
they found that for the vast majority of
black men in 1940, the racial disadvan-
tage was greater in absolute value than
the effect of education was; in 1990, how-
ever, the reverse was true: education was
a much more signi½cant factor than be-
ing black. Finally, class effects–in terms
of relative educational attainment–sub-
stantially increased over this time span
for black men. “These results,” state
Sakamoto and Tzeng, “support Wilson’s
thesis of the declining signi½cance of
race, and they are consistent with his
claim that in the modern industrial pe-
riod after the civil rights movement,
‘economic class position [is] more im-
portant than race in determining black
chances for occupational mobility.’”13
Nonetheless, this comparison over
broad historical periods should not lead
us to overlook changes in the relative
importance of race and class within the
current modern or postindustrial period.
Here, I would include changes that nar-
row or increase the role that either race
or class plays in black occupational ad-
vancement. On this connection, Michael
Hout’s signi½cant 1984 ½ndings revealed
that public-sector employment “provid-
ed more high and middle-class occupa-
tions for black men than did the private
sector employment” and therefore played
“an important role in both occupational
upgrading among blacks and the emer-
gence of class cleavages within the black
population.”14In The Declining Signi½cance
of Race, I did not highlight the relative
contribution of the government sector
and the corporate sector to black occu-
pational gains. Given Hout’s ½ndings
(and his subsequent research on this is-
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The Declining Signi½cance of Racetoday, I
would not only place greater emphasis
on black gains in the public sector and
the major role of the polity in the crys-
tallization of a black class structure, I
would also underline the role and impor-
tance of af½rmative action programs. In
the process, I would discuss the impact
of a possible contraction in government
employment as well as waning public
support for af½rmative action on the oc-
cupational mobility of the more advan-
taged and educated African Americans,
issues to which I now turn.
Using data from the Current Population
Survey, sociologist Melvin E. Thomas
demonstrated that “contrary to the as-
sumption of the declining signi½cance 
of race thesis, blacks with higher levels
of education were found to be worse off
than less educated, lower status blacks
when compared to similar whites.”15I
½nd two shortcomings with Thomas’s
treatment of my thesis. First, Thomas
failed to disaggregate the data to show
comparisons between younger and older
educated blacks. Second, he neglected
to mention that in the second edition 
of The Declining Signi½cance of Race(pub-
lished in 1980), I referred to the signi½-
cant income gap between all college-
educated African Americans and all col-
lege-educated whites that still exists,
noting that this ½nding was largely a
consequence of the substantially lower
incomes of older educated blacks. 
Denied the opportunity to move into
higher paying occupations when they
graduated from college, or discouraged
from pursuing such careers, older black
college graduates tend to be concentrated
in lower-paying ½elds such as teaching,
social welfare, and segregated services;
they were rarely employed as executives
or professionals in large corporations
when they entered the labor market. By
contrast, younger educated blacks are
now entering, and are encouraged to en-
ter, ½nance, accounting, management,
chemistry, engineering, and computer
science–½elds from which they were
deterred previously. I quoted a 1978 paper
by Clifton Wharton, then chancellor of
the State University of New York, who
stated, “[I]n 1966, 45 percent of all black
college graduates were majoring in edu-
cation, today only 26 percent are. In 1966
only 5 percent of the Blacks were study-
ing business, today 18 percent are.”16
I also stated that prior to the 1970s,
African American men more often en-
rolled in education programs than in pro-
grams that prepare students for higher-
paying corporate jobs, such as business
or accounting. For all these reasons, the
incomes of older educated black males
lag signi½cantly behind the incomes 
of comparable white males, whereas
younger college-educated black males
had approached income parity with 
their white counterparts.
Recognizing the need to focus on
youngereducated blacks in the post–
civil rights period to provide “an appro-
priate test of the declining signi½cance 
of race within the black middle class,”
sociologists In Soo Son, Suzanne W.
Model, and Gene A. Fisher examined
“interracial differences in the net effect 
of higher education among young work-
ers who entered the labor market after
the mid-1960s.” Analyzing data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(psid) from 1968 to 1981 on the occu-
pational mobility and earnings attain-
ment of young black and white males,
the authors found “evidence of class
polarization among blacks in the era 
following the 1960s’ antidiscrimination
legislation.” In 1974, blacks lacking a
high school diploma earned 57 percent 
of what black college graduates earned,
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was 65 percent. By 1981, blacks without 
a high school diploma earned only 36.6
percent of what blacks with a college
degree earned, while the analogous ratio
for the two groups of whites declined
only to 58.5 percent.17
Moreover, Son, Model, and Fisher
found not only that African American
men without a high school degree con-
sistently earn the smallest proportion of
comparably educated whites’ incomes,
but they were the only group that expe-
rienced a decline in their absolute real
dollar earnings, bringing their 1981 earn-
ings to only two-thirds that of their white
counterparts. Black high school gradu-
ates’ earnings were slightly better in both
absolute and relative terms, with an earn-
ings gap that increased 7 percent between
1974 and 1981. By contrast, the progress
of black college graduates was substan-
tially greater, with incomes that changed
from fewer than 6 percent of compara-
ble whites’ incomes in 1974 to matching
the income of their white counterparts
in 1981. Even more spectacular, “[B]lack
college graduates obtain more prestigious
posts than their white counterparts.”18
These ½ndings are consistent with the
data I presented on the black/white in-
come gap of younger college graduates
in the second edition of The Declining
Signi½cance of Race. 
Despite the progress of educated blacks,
Son, Model, and Fisher warned: “[T]he
racial parity achieved by young college-
educated blacks in the 1970s will be main-
tained only if the government’s commit-
ment to af½rmative action does not slack-
en. Ideological and economic pressures
to reduce federal spending, coupled with
a tighter business environment, could
easily lead to fewer opportunities for
blacks.”19Sociologist Marshall I. Pomer
reached a similar conclusion. In his 1986
article on intragenerational mobility
based on a subset of the data used by
Hout, he stated: “Opportunities for
blacks were best in the public sector
where the observed rate of intrasector
upward mobility was actually higher 
for blacks than for whites. . . .Since the
public sector offers the most opportu-
nity for black advancement, reductions
in government employment are likely to
be especially detrimental to blacks.”20
A 1996 study by A. Silvia Cancio, T.
David Evans, and David J. Maume pre-
sents data suggesting that these concerns
were justi½ed. The authors also appropri-
atelypointed out that “aggregate black/
white earnings are invalid because older
Blacks presently earn less than whites
because of past discrimination practices”
and concluded that a comparison of the
salaries of young workers would be the
“most appropriate test of the signi½cance
of race in the modern industrial period.”
Using psiddata from 1976 and 1985, they
found that the effect of race, after control-
ling for other variables, increased during
this period, and that the proportion of
the racial gap in hourly wages due to dis-
crimination (that is, after racial differ-
ences in measured quali½cations were
taken into account) also increased dur-
ing this time span. Thus, they argued,
“[T]he government’s retreat from anti-
discrimination initiatives in the 1980s re-
sulted in organizational discrimination
against blacks and contributed to the
reversal in the postwar trend toward
racial parity in earnings.”21
Cancio, Evans, and Maume observed
that until 1980, my arguments of observ-
able racial progress are essentially correct.
However, they stated: “Wilson gave no
indication that he expected the long run
trend toward racial parity in earnings to
reverse in the 1980s. But that is what has
happened to young cohorts.”22 In the
epilogue to my book’s second edition, I
acknowledged that vigorous af½rmative
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the immediate future “because it is dif½-
cult to determine if the gains that younger
educated blacks are experiencing in entry
level positions will be reflected in promo-
tions to higher level jobs in later years.”
But I went on to say: “[A]t this point
there is also reason to believe that trained
and educated blacks, like trained and
educated whites, will continue to enjoy
the advantages and privileges of their
class status. It appears that the powerful
political and social movement against
job discrimination will mitigate against
any effective and systematic movement
to exclude quali½ed blacks.”23 I noted
that the real issue is improving the plight
of the black lower class, whose condi-
tions have not been addressed by pro-
grams like af½rmative action.
The research by Cancio and her col-
leagues suggests that my optimism con-
cerning the movement against job dis-
crimination was unfounded: “Events in
the 1980s proved that African Americans
cannot take for granted the political com-
mitments to af½rmative action and equal
opportunity legislation. . . .Our results
suggest that a waning devotion to these
ideals negatively affected the earnings
of Black workers.”24Their research clear-
ly underscores the importance of the
strength and direction of future govern-
ment efforts to promote racial equality.
They also point to the need for careful
longitudinal studies to understand fully
the racial differences in career dynamics: 
Blacks and Whites are more likely to be
paid equally at the beginning of their ca-
reers. Research that observes people at 
the beginning of their work and examines
race differences as they move through the
stages of a career . . .will shed needed light
on the experiences of Blacks within orga-
nizations. Moreover, it is important to com-
pare cohorts who started their careers in
different decades, as government policies
on the labor market have changed over
time. If these policies affect careers at their
starting points, does their impact last into
mid- and late-careers similarly for Whites
and Blacks?25
For the present essay, in the absence 
of longitudinal studies, I examined co-
horts of male workers ages twenty-½ve
to twenty-nine at ten-year intervals,
using ½gures from the Current Popula-
tion Survey comparable to the 1977 ½g-
ures originally reported in the second
edition of The Declining Signi½cance of
Race. I found that the black/white earn-
ings ratio for college graduates declined
signi½cantly from 1977 to 1987 (blacks
who graduated from college earned 93
percent as much as their white counter-
parts in 1977, but by 1987, that ratio had
dropped to 73.2 percent). The ratio in-
creased by 9 percentage points between
1987 and 1997 (from 73.2 percent to 82.5),
then decreased by 2.9 percent from 1997
to 2007 (from 82.5 percent to 79.6 per-
cent). Thus, despite some improvements
during the 1990s, by 2007, the income
ratio of young black college-educated
males was signi½cantly below the ratio
of 1977.26
Finally, in 1995, political scientist
Theodore J. Davis presented ½ndings 
on the consequences of race and class
interaction for both upward and down-
ward mobility. Using data from the 1972
to 1989 Cumulative General Social Sur-
vey, Davis found that although there is
some evidence of a very gradual decline
in the role of race in influencing occu-
pational attainment in the 1980s, and
although both black and white males
experienced intergenerational occupa-
tional upward mobility in the 1980s,
black males were also more likely than
white males to experience downward
occupational mobility.27
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section, I reiterate a point I made earlier:
if I were writing The Declining Signi½cance
of Racetoday, I would place greater em-
phasis not only on the role of the public
sector in accounting for black occupa-
tional mobility, but also on the impor-
tance of sustained public support for anti-
discrimination programs, including af-
½rmative action, to ensure that the gains
continue or, at the least, are not reversed.
However, I also need to address another
aspect of “the declining signi½cance of
race” thesis–namely, class changes with-
in the African American community.
One of the basic arguments of The
Declining Signi½cance of Raceis that there
has been a deepening economic schism
as reflected in a widening gap between
lower-income and higher-income black
families. In light of more recent data,
not only has the family income gap
between poorer and better-off African
Americanscontinued to widen, but the
situation of the bottom ½fth of black
families has deteriorated since 1975 
(see Table 1). 
In 2007, 45.6 percent of all poor blacks
had incomes below 50 percent of the
poverty line.28Overall, poor black fam-
ilies fell below the poverty line by an
average of $9,266 in 2007, a depth of
poverty exceeding that of all other racial/
ethnic groups in the United States.29
Regardless of the reversal of the relative
income gains of younger educated blacks
reported in the previous section, the gap
between the haves and have-nots in the
African American population continues
to grow.
Research also indicates that “higher
socioeconomic status Blacks have more
White neighbors, fewer poor neighbors,
and live in neighborhoods with higher
housing values.”30This fact is important
because one’s neighborhood controls ac-
cess to jobs and schools, and even expo-
sure to violence. Using individual-level
data from the geocoded version of the
psidfor the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and
2001 to correspond with the decadal cen-
suses, urban planner Lance Freeman
found that higher socioeconomic status
among African Americans is generally
associated with greater integration and
improved locational outcomes. 
The strength of these relationships,
however, did not increase between 1970
and 2000. “Class does matter,” Freeman
states. “Higher status Blacks generally
live in higher-status neighborhoods and
those with more Whites. But the impor-
tance of class has not increased since
1970. The determinants of spatial out-
comes for Blacks have been remarkably
durable at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury. . . .It appears that Blacks will have 
to achieve upward mobility in other do-
mains, such as education, before achiev-
ing widespread access to higher-status
and White neighborhoods.”31Reaching
this goal may be more of a challenge for
black males than for black females.
Indeed, what has also changed since I
wrote The Declining Signi½cance of Raceis
that the black class structure increasing-
ly reflects gender differences, especially
among younger blacks, as males have
fallen behind females on a number of
socioeconomic indicators: employment
rates, high school completion rates, and
average income, with some of the sharp-
est discrepancies at the lower end of the
income hierarchy.32Black women have
also far outpaced black men in college
completion in recent years. Despite the
fact that the gender gap in college degree
attainment is increasing across all racial
groups, with women generally exceeding
men in rates of college completion, this
discrepancy is particularly acute among
African Americans. That gap has wid-
ened steadily over the past twenty-½ve
63
William
Julius
Wilson
140 (2)  Spring 2011years. In 1979, for every 100 bachelor’s
degrees earned by black men, 144 were
earned by black women. In 2006 to 2007,
for every 100 bachelor’s degrees con-
ferred on black men, 196 were conferred
on black women–nearly a two-to-one
ratio. To put this gap into a larger con-
text, for every 100 bachelor’s degrees
earned by white men and every 100
earned by Hispanic men, white women
earned 130 and Hispanic women earned
158, respectively (see Table 2). The gap
widens higher up on the educational 
ladder. For every 100 master’s degrees
and 100 doctorates earned by black
men, black women earned 255 and 193,
respectively. These ratios have huge im-
plications for the social organization of
the black community. If present trends
continue, future discussion of the black
class structure will have to include a
gender component to show the increas-
ing proportion of black women and de-
creasing proportion of black men in
higher socioeconomic positions.
In the epilogue to the second edition of
The Declining Signi½cance of Race, I argued
that a conclusion one could draw from
my book was “that the sole concentra-
tion on policy programs dealing with ra-
cial bias makes it dif½cult for blacks to
recognize how their fortune is inextri-
cably connected with the structure and
the functioning of the modern American
economy.”33In concluding the epilogue,
I wrote: “Supporters of basic economic
reform can only hope that in the 1980s
the needs and interests of the black poor
(as well as those of the other minority
poor and the white poor) will no longer
be underrepresented in serious public
discussions, policies, and programs.”34
These statements were influenced by my
sense at the time that while race-specif-
ic programs like af½rmative action had
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Table 1
Average Income of Black Families by Income Group
1975 1985 1995 2005 2007
1975–2007 
(changes in
dollars)
1975–2007
(percent
change)
Lowest
Fifth $8,939 $7,284 $7,463 $7,784 $8,143 -$796 -8.9%
Second
Fifth 18,533 17,833 20,073 22,085 23,384 4,851 26.2
Middle
Fifth 30,650 30,832 35,022 35,842 40,278 9,628 31.4
Fourth
Fifth 46,095 49,396 55,408 61,407 64,573 18,478 40.1
Highest
Fifth 78,031 90,902 111,767 129,002 132,565 54,534 69.9
Top 5 
Percent 106,908 131,672 183,471 212,818 220,916 114,008 106.6
All ½gures reported in 2007 dollars. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2008 Annual 
Social and Economic Supplements, Table F-3, “Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of 
Families.” elevated and would continue to improve
the employment prospects of trained
and highly educated blacks, they had 
not enhanced the employment oppor-
tunities of the black poor. I felt there-
fore that the focus should shift to more
class-based, race-neutral programs. I 
no longer support this view. Recogniz-
ing that a detailed discussion of policy
options would require far more space
than that allocated for this article, I
would like to conclude with a brief dis-
cussion of why both race-speci½c and
race-neutral–including class-based–
programs must be strongly emphasized
and pursued to combat racial inequality.
As I indicated earlier, many studies
claim to address or challenge “the de-
clining signi½cance of race” thesis by
presenting data on residential segrega-
tion, racial composition in schools, and
discrimination in public places without
relating the ½ndings to my argument
that the concentration of racial antago-
nisms has shifted from the economic
sector to the sociopolitical order. One
notable exception is Jonathan Rieder,
whose 1985 book, Canarsie: The Jews and
Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism, dis-
cusses the racial antagonisms of Jews
and Italians against inner-city blacks in
Brooklyn and relates the conflict to my
central theme regarding the increasing
centrality of racial conflict that origi-
nates “in the sphere of consumption
rather than of production.” In other
words, his ½eld research supported the
idea that “competition between blacks
and whites has moved from the sphere
of jobs to the enjoyment of public goods,
like schools and entitlements.”35
The research discussed in the previous
section suggests that the white backlash
against racial entitlements such as af½rma-
tive action, which is so clearly described
in Rieder’s book, contributed to the gov-
ernment’s retreat from antidiscrimina-
tion policies during the 1980s, a retreat
that may have influenced hiring and pro-
motion decisions in the corporatesector
as well. It should come as no surprise that
waning support for af½rmative action
programs would have an adverse effect
on blacks, especially more advantaged
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Table 2
Gender Imbalance in Higher Education: Number of Degrees Earned by Women for Every 
One Hundred Degrees Earned by Men, Academic Year 2006–2007
Non-Hispanic
White
Non-Hispanic 
Black
Hispanic Asian/Paci½c
Islander
Associate’s
Degrees 158 225 171 141
Bachelor’s
Degrees 130 196 158 122
Master’s 
Degrees 167 255 185 122
Doctoral 
Degrees 124 193 129 108
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Post-
secondary Education Data System, Fall 2007, Completions component.blacks. A number of empirical studies
have revealed signi½cant differences in
the family and neighborhood environ-
ments of blacks and whites that are un-
derstated when standard measures of
socioeconomic status are employed.
Take, for example, the question of fam-
ily background. Even when white par-
ents and black parents report the same
average income, white parents have 
substantially more assets than do 
black parents. 
Whites with the same amount of
schoolingas blacks usually attend better
high schools and colleges. Furthermore,
children’s test scores are affected not only
by the social and economic status of their
parents but also by the social and econom-
ic status of their grandparents, meaning
that it could take several generations be-
fore adjustments in socioeconomic in-
equality produce their full bene½ts. Thus,
if we were to rely solely on the standard
criteria for college admission, such as
sat scores, even many children from
black middle-income families would 
be denied admission in favor of middle-
income whites, who are not weighed
down by the accumulation of disadvan-
tages that stem from racial restrictions
and who, therefore, tend to score high-
er on the sat and similar conventional
tests. For all these reasons, the success 
of younger educated blacks remains heav-
ilydependent on af½rmative action pro-
grams, whereby more flexible criteria 
of evaluation are used to gauge poten-
tial to succeed.
The policy implications are obvious.
Race-speci½c policies like af½rmative ac-
tion will be required for the foreseeable
future to ensure the continued mobility
of educated blacks. But af½rmative action
programs are not designed to address the
problems of poor blacks, which require
greater emphasis on demand-side solu-
tions, such as creating tight labor mar-
kets in which employers are looking for
workers rather than workers looking for
employers.
At the time of this writing, the nation
is plagued with one of the highest unem-
ployment rates since the Great Depres-
sion, affecting all racial and ethnic groups
in the United States. For almost ½ve de-
cades, the black/white unemployment
ratio was 2.0 or greater, which means
that the black unemployment rate was at
least twice that of the white unemploy-
ment rate in both good and bad econom-
ic times. What is unique about the cur-
rent economic crisis is that the unem-
ployment rate has surged for both blacks
and whites. Since December 2009, the
black/white unemployment ratio has
fallen below 2.0. The ratio was 1.87 in
October 2010 and 1.88 in November
2010.36
This scenario presents a dilemma for
the Obama administration, which has
publicly acknowledged the need to com-
bat racial inequality. Given the upsurge
in unemployment among all racial groups,
including whites, it would be politically
prudent for the president to advance pro-
grams that address nationwide jobless-
ness. However, a strong case could be
made for introducing programs that are
designed to combat unemployment in
the highest areas of joblessness, includ-
ing a mix of private- and public-sector
initiatives. For example, in black inner
cities, where the number of very low-
skilled individuals vastly exceeds the
number of low-skill jobs, a healthy dose
of public-sector job creation is needed.
This approach would also apply, say, in
white and Hispanic areas that feature
high rates of joblessness.
The point is that a continuous struggle
is needed to address the problems of ra-
cial inequality–some calling for race-
based solutions, like af½rmative action,
others calling for class-based solutions,
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ment in areas with the highest rates of
joblessness. Accordingly, if I were writ-
ing The Declining Signi½cance of Race to-
day, I would provide more balance in 
my policy recommendations by placing
much greater emphasis on the need to
stronglyand continuouslyembrace, as well
as advance, both race- and class-based
solutions to address life chances for 
people of color.
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